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Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life: WIDOW
DENIED RECOVERY ON ACCIDENTAL DEAm POUCYWHEN
HUSBAND DIED FROM AIDS
CONTAMINATED TRANSFUSION.
In Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life, 315 Md.
761, 556 A.2d 1135 (1989), the Coun of
Appeals of Maryland barred an insured
widow's recovery under an accidental
death policy after her husband died of
AIDS (Acquired Immune DefiCiency Syndrome) which he accidentaUycontracted
from a necessary blood transfusion. The
coun held that hemophilia was a "sickness or disease" within the meaning of a
policywbich excluded recovery for death
by "sickness or disease." Id. at 770, 556
A.2d at 1140. Thus, the coun deemed
that accidentally contracting AIDS while
under medical treatment for a sickness or
disease such as hemophilia was not the
type of "accident" contemplated in the
insurance policy.
Petitioner is the surviving spouse of
Anthony Cheney, who suffered from
hemophilia. While undergoing a treatment for hemophilia, Mr. Cheney received a transfusion containing the AIDS
virus. At the age of24, he died of respiratory failure, a direct consequence of the
AIDS virus.
When Mr. Cheney died, he and his wife
jointly held an accidental death policy
under which the insurance company
agreed to pay a designated amount in the
event of the accidental death of either
pany. Upon Mr. Cheney's death, however, the insurance company refused
payment assening that his death was not
"accidental" as defined in the policy.
Cheney, 70 Md. App. at 164-65, 520A.2d
at 403. The policy excluded "any loss
. . . caused by or resulting from . . .
sickness or disease or medical or surgical
treatment therefore (sic) ...." Cheney,
315 Md. at 763, 556A.2d at 1136.
Mrs. Cheney filed suit in the Circuit
Coun for Baltimore City claiming that
her husband's death was accidental.
Judge Elsbeth Bothe granted the insurance company's motion for summary
judgment based on its assenions that Mr.
Cheney'S death resulted from sickness or
disease, or from medical treatment. The
coun of special appeals affirmed, also
suggesting that no "accident" had occurred within the meaning ofthe policy.
Id. at 764, 556 A.2d at 1137.
The coun of appeals began its analysis
by rejecting the insurance company's
contention that coverage was excluded
because death resulted from a sickness or
disease.Id. (relying on General Accounting Co. v. Homely, 109 Md. 93, 99,71 A.

524 (1908». In GeneralAccounting, the
coun of appeals held that where death
resulting from a disease is caused by an
accident, the accident is the true and
predominant cause of death. As a result,
the disease is merely a link in the chain of
causation. Cheney, 315 Md. at 764,556
A.2d at 1137.
The coun of appeals then considered
whether the insured's death resulted
from medical treatment for sickness or
disease. The coun first determined that
the accidental injury occurred when the
contaminated blood was injected into
Mr. Cheney and found unpersuasive Mrs.
Cheney's argument that the accident
occurred when the blood was drawn
from the infected donor. Mrs. Cheney
reasoned that the accident causing death
occurred prior to any medical treatment
for hemophilia. She argued, therefore,
that the exclusion in the policy did not
apply.Id. at 766, 556 A.2d at 1138.
Concluding that death resulted from
the transfusion, namely, from the medical treatment for hemophilia, the coun
was faced with the question of whether
the insured's hemophilia was a "sickness
or disease" within the meaning of the
policy.Id. To determine the meaning of
the policy, the coun looked to the intention of the panies which is ascenained
from the policy as a whole. Under this
construction, words are accorded their
usual, ordinary and accepted meaning,
unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Id. (relying on Pacific Indem. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty, 302 Md. 383, 388,
488 A.2d 486 (1985».
The coun found no ambiguity in the
meaning of the word "disease." The coun
noted that there was no evidence of any
contrary or specific meaning and focused
on the ordinary meaning of the word
"disease." The coun concluded that
hemophilia was a "disease" within its
commonly accepted meaning, and
within the meaning of the insurance
policy under which Mr. Cheney was
covered. Id. at 770, 556A.2d at 1140. Because Mr. Cheney's death resulted from
medical treatment for a disease, Mrs.
Cheney was precluded from receiving
payment under the policy's exclusionary
language.
The coun of appeals concluded that
the cause of Mr. Cheney'S death was an
accidental injury. However, because
hemophilia was a disease within the
meaning ofthe Cheney's insurance policy, the injury (receiving AIDS contaminated blood) was cause by medical treatment for a disease. Therefore, the accident was not covered by the accidental

death policy. Consequently, the coun of
appeals has narrowly construed the
meaning of "accidental" in death policies. As a result, the insurance industry'S
liability under such policies, specifically
with regard to AIDS related death, has
been limited.
----Eugenia Reed Oshrine
State v. Gorman: COURT UPHOLDS
THE USE OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES TO STRIKE BlACK
JURORS WHEN mE DEFENDANT IS
WHITE
InState v. Gonnan, 315 Md. 402, 554
A.2d 1203 (1989), the Coun of Appeals
of Maryland held that the state's exercise
of peremptory challenges to strike the
only two black jurors from a jury panel
was constitutionally permissible when
the defendant in question was white.
Gorman, a male caucasian, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Coun for
Harford County of robbery with a deadly
weapon and related offenses. During
voin dire, the prosecution exercised its
perem ptory challenges to strike the only
two black veniremen from the panel.
Gorman was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, pursuant to Maryland's recidivist statute. Id. at 404, 554
A.2d at 1204.
On appeal, Gorman contended that
the state's use of peremptory challenges
to strike the black veniremen from the
panel constituted a denial of equal protection in violation of the founeenth
amendment and a violation of the sixth
amendment's guarantee of an impanial
jury. The coun of special appeals affirmed his conviction. After the coun of
appeals denied ceniorari, the Supreme
Coun of the United States granted Gorman's petition for ceniorari. The SUo
preme Coun vacated the judgment of the
intermediate appellate coun and remanded the case to that coun for reconsideration in light of the recent holding
in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314
(1987). On remand, the coun of special
appeals reversed, and remanded it for a
new trial, relying on Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986), Griffith, and Chew v.
State, 71 Md. App. 681, 527 A.2d 332,
cert. granted, 311 Md. 301, 534A.2d 369
(1987), for its decision. After the coun of
special appeals denied the state's motion
for reconsideration, the coun of appeals
granted both the state's petition and
Gorman's cross petition for writs of
ceniorari. Gonnan, 315 Md. at 404-405,
554 A.2d at 1204. On appeal, the panies
'stipulated that there were only three
issues:
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(1) Did the court of special appeals
misapply Batson v. Kentucky to the
circumstances of this case?
(2) Can Gorman assert a sixth
amendment claim of fair cross-section deprivation in the composition
of his jury?
(3) Did the court of special appeals
err in mandating a new trial?
[d. at 413-14,554 A.2d at 1208.
Regarding the first question, the court
considered the applicability of Batson to
the facts before it. Batson, which involved the state exercising its peremptory challenges to strike black jurors
from the trial of a black man, created a
three-part evidentiary standard that a defendant must meet in order to establish a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in petit jury selection: 1) defendant must establish that he is a member
of a cognizable racial group and that the
prosecution has used peremptory challenges to strike members of the same race
from venire; 2) the defendant may rely on
the fact that peremptory challenges permit discrimination by those who desire to
discriminate in their selection of a petit
jury; and 3) defendant must show that
these facts and any other circumstances
surrounding the jury selection raise an
inference that the state used their peremptory challenges to strike veniremen
from the petit jury because of their race.
[d. at 410, 554 A.2d at 1207 (relying on
Batson 476 U.S. at 96).
The Gorman court held that the court
of special appeals had misapplied the
Batson standard as that holding did not
include situations where the jurors
struck were not the same race as the
defendant. Gorman, 315 Md. at 414-16,
554 A.2d at 1208-10. Furthermore, the
circumstances in Gorman failed to meet
the first prong of the Batson evidentiary
standard. Gorman was not a member of
a cognizable racial group, nor were the
jurors who were struck the same race as
Gorman. [d. at 416, 554A.2d at 1209-10.
Next, the court rejected Gorman's contention that the state's exercise of peremptory challenges violated his constitutional right to due process of law. Although Gorman relied on Peters v. Ki/f,
407 U.S. 493 (1972) for support, the
court noted that Peters involved due
process because the jury had been illegally composed, not because of any misuse of peremptory challenges. Therefore, the court concluded that the state's
use of peremptory challenges in Gorman's case did not rise to the level of a
due process violation. Gorman, 315 Md.
at 417, 554A.2d at 1210.
Similarly, the court rejected Gorman's

sixth amendment claim of fair cross-section deprivation; first, because the Batson Court had ignored a similar claim;
and second, because the later case of
Lockbartv. McCree, 476U.S. 162 (1986)
expressly rejected the notion that the fair
cross-section guarantee of the sixth
amendment applied to peremptory
challenges. Gorman at 417-19,554 A.2d
at 1210-11.
Regarding the issue of whether the
lower court erred in mandating a new
trial, the court stated that the question
would only arise if in fact Batson applied
to the facts of Gorman's case. Since the
court previously determined that Batson
did not apply, it was not necessary to
consider the question. [d. at 420, 554
A.2d at 1211. Thus, the court of appeals
reversed the decision of the court of
special appeals, finding no constitutional violations from the state's exercise
of its peremptory challenges.
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Eldridge
opined that the actions of the state in this
case did constitute a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in violation of
the equal protection clause, and therefore, required the prosecution to provide an explanation for its conduct. [d. at
420-23, 554 A.2d at 1212-13. He also
believed that both Gorman's fourteenth
amendment due process rights and his
sixth amendment right to an impartial
jury had been violated, that the "same
class" rule (the first step of the Batson
evidentiary test) was inconsistent with
equal protection ofthe law (as it applies
to race discrimination), and that Gorman
had standing to challenge the racial discrimination in the selection ofthe petit
jury in his case, based on the rationale of
Peters [d. at 423-38, 554A.2d at 1213-21.
In the dissent's view, the state's use of
peremptory challenges to strike persons
from a petit jury solely because of their
race should shift the evidentiary burden
to the state to prove othetwise. [d. at 438,
554 A.2d at 1220-21.
The Gorman decision is Significant as
it illustrates Maryland's refusal to extend
the holding of Batson beyond the specific factual scenario in Batson. The consequences are: 1) the unconditional
nature of the peremptory challenge as it
has historically existed is preserved; and
2) white criminal defendants in Maryland
are now precluded from asserting discrimination when the state uses its peremptory challenges to strike black veniremen. Conversely, the state remains
free to strike blacks from the jury panel in
any criminal trial where the defendant is
not black.
-Gregory}. Swain

Nelson v. State: TRlALJUDGE'S
REFUSAL TO ALLOW PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION IN A SERIOUS
NONCAPITAL CASE, IN TIlE
ABSENCE OF SOUND REASON, IS
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
In Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62, 553
A.2d 667 (1989), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that the trial court's refusal to order a presentence investigation report in a serious noncapital case,
without giving a sound reason why the
investigation should not be made, was an
abuse of discretion.
The defendant, Michael B. Nelson, was
convicted of first degree murder in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Following pronouncement of the verdict, Nelson requested that the court order a
presentence investigation under Md.
Ann. Code art, 41, §4-609 (1986 & Supp.
1988), before imposing sentence. Although the state had no objection to the
investigation, the sentencing judge refused. The court's reasoning was that
such investigations were costly and
would not be ordered without a showing
of particular need.
On the date of the dispoSition, Nelson
again requested a presentence investigation, arguing that, because the court has
the discretion to suspend any part of a life
sentence, the court was obligated to
learn as much as possible about the defendant in order to impose a fair sentence. The court again refused and imposed a life sentence and two consecutive one-year sentences. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland subsequently affirmed the judgments and
sentencing. The only issue before the
court of appeals was whether the trial
court erred in refusing to order a presentence investigation.
The court of appeals began its analysis
by turning to Md. Ann. Code art. 41, §4609(b) which requires agents of the Division of Parole and Probation to provide
the court with presentence reports or
other investigations in all cases when
requested by any judge. Section 4-609
(c)(l) provides:
Prior to the sentence by the circuit
court of any county to the jurisdiction of the Division of Correction of
a defendant convicted of a felony, or
a misdemeanor which resulted in
serious physical injury or death to
the victim, or the referral of any
defendant to the Patuxent Institution, a presentence investigation
shall be completed by the Division
of Parole and Probation and considered by the court, unless the court
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